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LABOR UNIONISM AND CONVICT LABOR.
E. T. HnLm.1
The present tendency toward public control and public use of
prison labor is to a large extent the achievement of the political activity of organized labor. The question of convict labor and its relation in competition to free labor has grown increasingly important in
recent years and is receiving increased prominence in the discussion
and attempted legislation of trade unions. In the political and legislative propaganda many and varied demands are made looking toward the regulation of competition, rather than the abolition of penal
labor, and toward the improvement of the methods of dealing with the
delinquent and social offender. Among the specific measures for
protecting the citizen mechanic against a menacing competition and
the convict against exploitation, may be named the following points:
Public control and public use of convict labor, restriction of occupations which may be introduced in prison industry, limiting the number of prisoners employed on marketable wares, limiting the hours
of employment of convicts, preventing interstate shipment of prisonmade goods, forbidding importation of raw or finished material upon
which any penal labor has been bestowed, branding all prison-made
goods, restricting the use of powerful machinery in prison industry,
demanding hand processes so far as possible, and giving recognition
to the right of the prisoner to healthful employment, humane treatment, receiving awards for his dependent family, and a new chance
to make good as a citzen.
These points in the political and legislative program of organized
laboi represent the official attitude and demands. Individually and
locally a great variety of opinions and sentiments, however, have been
held; but the official utterances have never urged that prisoners be
maintained in idleness, but have sought to regulate the displacement
of citizen labor by convict labor and to minimize the evils of unequal
competition between subsidized and low-plane prison labor and that
of free citizens. The menacing effect of a subsidized and low-plane
competition has been more or less clearly recognized by labor leaders and has been the chief motive for the opposition against the unregulated convict labor as it existed throughout the greater part of
the last century. A second reason for this 6pposition is the moral
injustice of impairing the means of livelihood of honest citizens by the
labor of those who have violated the law of the state. A third rea'Graduate student, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.
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son is the inhumane treatment of prisoners by private employers and
contractors. For these reasons citizen mechanics have incessantly
striven for state control and state use of convict labor during a period
of more than three-quarters of a century, and extensive legislation
in that direction has been effected in the last twenty-five years..
The specific demands made by free labor and the motives which
prompted its agitation for the modification of former methods of employing convicts under the various methods of private control-the
contract, lease and piece-price systems-can be understood only by a
reference to the growth of the moral and penological principles and
economic or industrial evolution of our country since Colonial times.
The tracing of this development of penological and industrial methods
in relation to the conflict between convict and free labor is the task undertaken in this study. The period surveyed is that of our industrial
revolution, beginning near the opening of the nineteenth century; but
a brief account will be given of the economic significance of convict
labor in Colonial times as a background for the awakening and
changes which came in the manner of imposing penal labor in the
first quarter of the last century. The moral, philanthropic and penologic aspects of the question must receive some notice to give a fair
representation of the problem involved in the conflict between convict and free labor, but they will be presented only incidentally to the
main line of thought-the economic laws and origin of this competition, and the demands and political program of organized labor lookng toward the control of prison industry. However desirable it
might be to discover and trace the separate springs of action of
labor unions in their political career it would be impossible to isolate
and appraise the component interests and purposes, for life is a whole
and the economic, selfish and altruistic motives of action cannot be
altogether separated in description or practice. Hence no estimate will
be made of the relative importance of the various motives which have
influenced the attitude of free labor toward specific conditions of
convict labor. It is sufficient to observe that labor unionism has been
increasingly victorious in obtaining restriction and public control of
prison industry, and, with the co-operation of penologists and reformers, has brought on a more humane treatment of convicts in the
imposition of penal labor.
In tracing the relation of free labor to convict labor, three
forces must be considered. On the one hand are the development of
the methods of penal discipline and prison control and the growth of
the industrial processes; on the other hand is the force of organized
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labor in its endeavor to protect its means of livelihood from unequal
competition. We will hence discuss I. the development of the
methods of punishing convicts by imposing compulsory labor as a
substitute for other forms of punishments, especially during the
nineteenth century, with a brief account of the conditions in the eighteenth century; II. penal labor as an industrial factor, comprising
the development of the manner of employing convicts as affected by
the industrial revolution, and the economic significance of prison
labor as a source of competition with free labor; and III. the political.
activity of labor unionism in its endeavor to limit the extent and
nature of the competition with the subsidized and low-plane convict
labor.
I. The method of punishing offenders against society and the
manner of housing them underwent radical changes during the early
part of the nineteenth century. Some of these reforms had important
bearing upon the later problem of competition between convict and
free labor. (1). The amount of potential convict labor was increased
by substituting labor and imprisonment for other forms of punishment. (2). The persons sentenced.to imprisonment with labor were
brought together in large state penitentiaries and thereby increased
the severity of the competition with citizen labor in the locality of
the prison.
(1). During the eighteenth century penal labor was imposed
in only a few of our colonies. In so far as it was used, it was
applied either by imprisonment with labor, by the use of the indenture whereby convicts were bound out to serve private citizens
for a prescribed term, or by imprisonment by night and employment on public streets and public works by day.2 Massachusetts,
Connecticut and Pennsylvania made extensive use of labor as a penal
instrument during the eighteenth century, but the other colonies, it
appears, did not impose such penalties, but inflicted corporal punishment as a means of correction or retribution. Also the first state
laws enacted immediately after the Revolutionary War left the punishment for crime unmitigated in severity, save, perhaps, in Pennsylvania. But the rigor of the penal codes was toned down in later
revisions of the laws of the various states and labor was made an
alternative or a substitute for corporal, and lastly, to some extent, for
capital punishment. There was thus an increased number of crimes
punishable by labor, and means of employment was sought by extension of workhouses among the counties and by the establishment of
'Jour. of Criminal Law and Criminology, July, 1914, pp. 242-244.
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state prisons and penitentiaries.3 For example, in New York in 1788
the death penalty was attached to eleven crimes, and the justices of the
sessions were authorized to punish disorderly persons and vagrants
by six months' imprisonment and whipping. But in 1789 the act
was modified by adding hard labor to the imprisonment of disorderlies and vagrants and leaving the whipping to the discretion of the
courts.4 In 1796 the death penalty was imposed only for crimes of
'murder, treason and stealing from a church, and "imprisonment
only" or imprisonment with "hard labor" was imposed for other
offenses for which corporal punishment had formerly been inflicted.'
In a similar manner, as the prison reform extended among the other
states, compulsory labor was invariably provided for in the new
statutes. In 1829 ten states had adopted a revision of their penal
codes, but the other states "retained their old systems with no reform and no labor that would accustom the prisoners to an honest
mode of sustenance. 6
The substitution of labor with imprisonment for other forms of
punishment was one of the great penal reforms of the first half of
the last century and was a part not only of .the general improvement
in the method of dealing with the offenders against society, but also
of the general humanitarian development and expansion of the social
consciousness of that active and fertile period of our history. But
specifically the introduction of labor into prisons was urged because
"it is productive, it is healthful, it teaches convicts how to support
themselves when they leave prison, it is reformatory, and is consonant with republican principles." ' 7 In advocating the adoption of
labor in penal methods it was argued that the financial and disciplinary
advantages go hand in hand.8 "But there was a melancholy reverse to
this picture. There is much reason to believe that as a penitentiary, the
system was utterly inefficient for purposes of reform or amendment.
Indeed in nothing else than as a place of personal labor and restraint
3
Ibid.,
4

p. 245.
T. E. V. Smith, New York City in 1879, pp. 13-14.
'Laws of New York, March 26, 1796.
'Boston Pris. Disc. Soc. Rept. 1829, p. 31; de Beaumont and de Tocqueville;
Penitentiary System in U. S., p. 12.
Boston Pris. Disc. Soc. Rept. 1829, p. 34.
'Ibid., Rept. 1828, p. 16.
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was it a place of terror or punishment."0 But whatever abuses inflicted in the imposition of labor may have been, it is not probable
that they were as vicious as the mental, moral and physical deterioration caused by idle aggregate or solitary cellular imprisonment, and
were due to a lack of insight into the penological and moral significance of proper administration of penal labor. This was in the early
days of our " enitentiary system" when no technique for the management of these prisons or regulation of punitive labor had been acquired
by experience. The abuses were not inherent in the use of labor itself,
and its adoption as a penal instrument continued throughout the first
half of the century as a part of the prison reform movement. But the
increase of the supply of convict labor by substituting it for corporal
punishment together with other causes involved prison industry in
keen competition with the trades of citizen mechanics.
(2). A second cause for the development of this competition
was the concentration of convicts sentenced to penal labor in the newly
established state prisons and penitentiaries. Though this bringing
together of felons into large convict-holds did not itself increase the
potential supply of prison labor, it did increase the effectiveness of
competition of this labor in particular localities. This system of
housing also made possible the introduction of the factory processes
and thereby made prison manufactures effective in competition with
free industry. 10 The erection of state prisons and the concentration of
convicts occurred in all the states whether they had imposed penal
labor prior to the prison reform or not. Before this time convicts
were confined (and employed so far as labor was imposed) in county
workhouses and in "gaols" and each community provided the means
of imprisonment or of employment. But near the beginning of the
nineteenth century the states began to provide prison houses and
employment for certain classes of felons; and gradually this became
the familiar and conspicuous means of detention and correction. 1
This concentration of convicts in state penitentiaries was fostered by perhaps two factors-one penal and civic, and the other
economic. Criminals of higher degrees were sent to the state prisons
for safer detention and more rigorous discipline than could be main-

'Ibid., Rept. 1826, p. 43 (extract from Gov. Lincoln's message, Jan., 1826).
The deteriorating effect of penal labor viciously imposed is described at length
in "Inside Out; Or, Interior Views of New York State -Prison," pp. 18-22.
"Jour. Criminal Law and Criminology, July, 1914, p. 242, ff.
'Ibid., p. 245, ff.
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tained in the county workhouses.' 2 Also it was deemed more equitable that the state should provide the means of imprisonment and employment for convicts who were wards of the whole commonwealth
rather than of the counties where the crime may have been committed.
The increased number of persons sentenced to imprisonment with
labor under the new statutes substituting labor for other forms of
punishment further made it necessary to enlarge the means of detention and employment. This the state could do most economically
by erecting large prisons and workshops% This concentration of
prisoners made possible the aggregate or factory methods of employment and thereby increased the industrial efficiency of prison manufactures, prepared the way for the contract system and accentuated
competition with free citizen labor.'"
II. The effectiveness of this competition and the manner of employing prison labor are greatly influenced by the industrial development. This influence is operative in several ways.
(1). The plan
of supplying raw material, supervising the work and disposing of
the wares of prison manufacture tend to conform to the method of
carrying on free industry in any given period of the industrial revolution. (2). The significance of convict labor as a source of lowplane competition depends on the growth of the factory system, the
expansion of the competitive market and the separation of classes
and functions in the processes of production.
(1). The method of imposing compulsory labor is determined
by a mixture of forces and motives-economic, penological and humanitarian, but the general form of the employment of this labor
has in our country been determined chiefly by, or tended to conform
to, the manner of performing processes in the concurrent free industry. The employment of penal labor during the past century has
characteristic features determined by the growth of the factory system in free industry. But these methods are a modification of those
prevailing in the previous stage of our industrial revolution, and
hence we will consider very briefly (a) the methods of imposing penal
labor in the so-called colonial stage of our industrial history, limiting the discussion to the eighteenth century; (b) the period of transition of penal methods in the first quarter of the last century, during
which time the state prisons were being established and the aggregate method of employing convicts was being introduced in prison
'Laws of N. J., Feb. 15, 1798; of Mass., Mar. 15, 1805; of N. Y., Mar. 26,
1796.
"Jour. of Criminal Law and Criminology, July, 1914, pp. 242, 247.
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manufactures, and (c) the factory method of employing convicts
under private competitive methods which is lately being superceded
by state control and state use of prison labor.
(a) During the eighteenth century, as has already been intimated, convicts were employed, in so far as penal labor was imposed,
Under
either under the indenture or in workhouses and "gaols."
perdirect
in
a
the indenture employment was of course, supplied
sonal manner. This was also the case with misdemeanants sentenced
to the workhouses if the persons so punished had relatives or masters
in the community. If the prisoners were not the wards of residents
of the county, the keeper of the workhouse or "gabl" provided
employment. This individual method of employment was in keeping
with the industrial condition of the period, and was feasible because
the means of production were, as is the case in the domestic stage of
production, under the control of the separate family household. The
domestic stage of our industrial development is characterized by smallscale production; the market was personal and local, the business was
customs-order, and competition existed between the quality of goods
14
and not between their prices as is the case under the factory system.
Production was performed either by itinerant tradesmen who carried
on their work in the homes of their customers or by merchant-masters
who employed a few journeymen and directed the business. In the
former case the material was furnished by the customer, in the latter, by the merchant-master. The method of employing convicts and
of disposing of their wares was patterned after the manner of performing free industry. The indentured convict, if he were skilled
in any craft was employed in the home-shop under the direct supervision of the merchant-master lessee. If he were not skilled he was
under equally close personal supervision. The use of the indenture
was possible because of the scarcity of labor and the consequent lack
of popular sentiment against the presence of convicted persons in
the occupations of free citizens. The method of supplying the means
of employing persons committed to the houses of correction or workhouses was also in keeping with the prevailing industrial condition.
In the handicraft stage of production competition existed not between prices, but between the qualities of goods. Hence, to guarantee a good return from the labor of the prisoners employed at a craft
it was only necessary, as in the case of fre craftsmen, to guard
against poor workmanship and demand prices in keeping with the
"4Doc. Hist. of Amer. Ind. Soc., Introduction, Vol. 3.
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qualities of the goods. Barring a concentration of prisoners in a
community with its personal and local market and consequent oversupply of wares, such a profit was possible provided the keeper was
able to bargain successfully with the customers. It was expected
that there would be returns from the labor of the prisoners in excess
of the cost of their maintenance, and, no doubt, such was the case
prior to the erection of the state prisons; and it was expected that
even in these there would be a profit accruing from the labor of the
ifimates. But a change from this simple colonial method of providing employment and disposing of the wares of prison labor was
brought about by two factors; namely, first the breaking up of the
domestic and journeyman stage of industrial processes which made
it impracticable for the family to provide employment, thus making it
necessary for the state to perform that function, and which required
that prison-made wares be entered upon the competitive market; and
second, the increase of prisoners sentenced to hard labor and their concentration in the state prisons and penitentiaries. In the -colonial
period, to repeat, no detrimental competition existed between free
labor and convict labor because the prison-made wares were used by
the wards of the prisoner, because of the scarcity of labor in the new
country, and because competition in wares and labor was between
qualities and not between prices.
(b). The transition between this colonial status of controlling
and employing convict labor and the subsequent factory method was
brought about by the industrial and penologic development of the
first quarter of the last century. During this transitional period the
state prisons were developed, penal labor adopted as a means of correction and punishment, and the aggregate method of employing
prisoners was instituted. The responsibility for the. employment of
convicts was wholly assumed by the -state, and the wardens of the
state and county prisons became entrepreneurs on behalf of the
public in directing the prison industry. The warden or agent secured
the raw material, tools and machinery, directed the process of production and disposed of the commodities on the competitive price
15
market.
In economic history the first quarter of the century is known as
the genesis of our factory system and of our labor problems. "The
factory system secured its first real foothold .. .between 1806 and
1815, when the War of 1812, by suppressing trade with Europe,
'Jour. of Criminal Law and Criminology, July, 1914, p. 245, if.
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forced the American people to do their own manufacturing, and
turned large amounts of capital which had previously been employed
in trade and shipping into manufactures. The growth during this
period of isolation was extraordinary" 16 and continued with increasing momentum through the decades. Professor Ely designates the
years from 1789 to 1825 as the "germinal period" in the history of
American trade unionism. During these years "a separate class of
wage earners was appearing, who were especially appealed to by new
arguments concerning wages in the tariff discussions; workingmen 's
parties were organized; strikes and trade unions multiplied, and the
latter were combined into municipal and state federations."'1 7 These
growing factory methods and rising labor movement are reflected
also in the manner of supplying and directing the employment of convicts in prison manufactures. In this transitional period the state
performs the function of the merchant-manufacturer in supplying
the raw material and tools, directing the work and searching for a
market for wholesale and retail orders. The state laws directed that
the prison officials should "vend and dispose of all articles manufactured -in the prison.''1" Goods were sold in retail lots from
stores, 1 and in wholesale lots by shipment." Transportation facilities and the site of the prison played an important part in the em"R. T. Ely: Outlines of Economics (1912), p. 73.
'Ibid., pp. 73-74, 84.
'Laws of Mass., Mar. 13, 1806; of N. Y., Mar. 26, 1796.

"In 1806 the officials of the Massachusetts State Prison relate that "The

shoemakers are employed in supplying the prisoners and making boots and
shoes for sale. * * * Store No. 8, on Green's wharf in Boston, is occupied
as a 'State Prison Warehouse' for the reception of raw materials, etc., and for
vending the various articles of manufacture, which are deemed by competent
judges to be of the best quality and exhibit favorable specimens of ingenuity."
-Account of Mass. State Prison by the Board of Visitors (1806), p. 45.
"For many years after the erection of the New York State Prison the agent
purchased all raw material" and sold the wares from a prison store (G. Powers'
Account of N. Y. State Prison at Auburn, p. 25). In 1835 the N. Y. Central
Trades Union reported that a certain Elisha Bloomes sold his prison-made
wares from a store which bore the sign, "'Trades' Union Hat Store," expecting that the sign would obtain custom (Hist. of Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, p. 231).
In 1839 the cordwainers of the District of Columbia memorialized Congress,
representing that "a certain Andrew Hoover had recently opened an extensive
'boot and shoe store,' * * * that said 'boot and shoe store' is chiefly furnished by the labors of convicts let out by contract, that said Hoover, purporting himself to be a manufacturer, is thus enabled by the cheapness of convict
labor to furnish boots and shoes at such low prices as to insure to his establishment a great and increasing custom." (Sen. Doc. No. 174, 25th Cong., 3d
Sess., Vol. 3; see also Hist. of Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, pp. 53-56.)
""Also the delay and the distant market-much being shipped to New Orleans--constituted loss and hazard."-G. Powers' "A Brief Account of New

York State Prison," p. 53.
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ployment of convicts and in finding a market for their wares. 2' The
procuring of machinery and raw material for the prison manufactory
received prominent consideration. 22 Foremen or "instructors" were
hired to direct and oversee the prison workshop if the warden were
not skilled in a given craft or process. These instructors were
sometimes merely "favored convicts whose feeble or incompetent instruction was resented by the 'learning' prisoner." 2 3
A resemblance between the status of free industry and prison
manufacture is thus seen in the manner of furnishing capital, raw
material and tools, in supervising the process of production, and in
searching for the market. But prison labor is not an integral part
of the industrial world, and is removed from- the ordinary economic
necessity of acting in accordance with the industrial laws. For example, the state can maintain the prisoners in idleness, or can underbid
the market and sell wares indefinitely below the cost of production.
But the demand that prison labor be as remunerative as possible and
that at the same time it be wholesome in its influence upon discipline,
reformation and health makes the problem of administering this labor
a very difficult one. This was the case also in the early part of the
century, and several adverse circumstances in the management of
prisoners and of convict labor was involved in these penal and industrial demands. These adverse conditions were: (x) scarcity of work
and consequent heavy prison expenses; (y) overburdening the wardens with industrial and administrative or disciplinary duties; and (z)
resulting from both the inadequacy of employment and neglect by
the warden, an evil and harmful condition of penal methods.
-

(x). The labor and industry of the large prisons over-supplied
the limited demands of the market, and a vexing problem of finding
employment for the inmates of these prisons arose. This lack of employment was experienced at the very beginning of the penitentiary
system, 2 4 and resulted in all the states in a large annual deficit until
'Ibid., Auburn Prison "is inconveniently located for transportation, as the
Erie Canal passes it at the distance of seven miles." (See also Annual Report
of Eastern Penit. Pa. 1839, p. 9.
'Laws of N. Y., Mar. 26, 1796; of Mass., Mar. 13, 1806; of N. Y., Feb. 15,

1798.
="Inside Out," p. 135.
'About a year after the opening of the Massachusetts State Prison (i.e.,
in 1806), the Board of Visitors reported that "the expense had hitherto exceeded
all anticipation, and the unceasing exertion of the former Board of Visitors had
failed to make any essential diminution. * * * There has at times been a
deficiency of suitable work.

The directors hope to correct this by contracting

-
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the decade of the twenties, at which time several of the states
succeeded in netting a profit from the labor of their convicts. 25 In
urging employment for prisoners, "productive" work was generally
insisted upon, meaning employment from which pecuniary returns
could be realized. Consequently the presence or absence of work
hinged in a large measure on the question as to whether or not the
wares would find a demand on the market. The problem of conducting profitably the prison industry was further affected by the introduction of machine processes into free industry, which forced down
the market price and in consequence made the prison industry liable
to greater loss because of its inability to keep pace with the advance
of industrial processes. 26 The search for marketable wares and for
employment suited to the needs of the prisoners led to the introduction of a great variety of occupations. The greater the number
with manufacturers and others for the employment of any number of convicts
that may be found convenient; and they seriously invite the attention of those
who want any quantity of coarse work to be done to reflect on the advantage to
themselves and society of engaging it at this institution. [Because of the low
expense] of the diet and regimen of a prison, the labor of the convicts can be
afforded at comparatively small expense. Many contracts for heavy work and
some that required much ingenuity have been performed here to the material
advantage of individuals and the state (Appendix, Report of the Board of
Visitors of Mass. State Prison, pp. 18-19). The difficulty of securing employment is further shown by an extract from the report of the Prison Commissioners in 1814, which says that "It had been the fond thought that the [prison]
labor would pay for all expense," but in that they were disappointed. There
was serious discussion of employing the treadmill, but finding that its efficiency in power was very low, the idea was discarded (Haynes' Hist. of Mass.
State Prison, pp. 4, 13). The treadmill was being used in New York at that
time and the power was applied to the grinding of corn-about one bushel per
man per day. In 1824 (cf., Rept. Lab. Comm. 1886, pp. 504-5) the treadmill was
used in the Connecticut State Prison for the purpose of grinding corn for prison
use, and occasionally for the neighboring inhabitants. These are the only instances discovered of the use of the treadmill in the United States. In New
York, likewise, the employment of prisoners was very irregular and unproductive,--sometimes in a pin factory, on public highway, picking oakum, and
sometimes unemployed. The site of Sing-Sing prison was chosen in order that
the convicts might be employed in the inexhaustible marble quarry on the banks
of the North River, thirty miles above New York City (Boston Pris. Disc. Soc.
1827, p. 112).
'The New Hampshire state prison became self-supporting in 1818 (cf.,
David Dyer Hist. of Albany Penitentiary, pp. 450-451). Mr. Dyer says: "It
[was] believed that this [was] the first instance recorded in penal history of
convicts supporting themselves." Massachusetts in 1825 netted a profit of ten
thousand dollars from the industries in her state prison, under the contract system (Boston Pris. Disc. Soc. 1826, p. 43; 1828, pp. 15-17). Likewise Connecticut,
Maryland, New York, and Kentucky netted a profit soon after the introduction
of the contract system during the latter part of the decade of the twenties. The
state prison of Kentucky and its inmates were leased to an entrepreneur and the
profits shared between the state and the lessee, who had the supervision not
only of the labor of the prisoners, but of their discipline and maintenance
as well.
'Journal of Criminal Law ind Criminology, July, 1914, p. 249.
861
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of convicts grouped together in a given locality the greater was the
need of diversifying occupations. A second reason for the diversification of industries was the desire to accommodate the crafts to the
skill of the prisoners, but it was most generally true that the skill of
the convicts was adapted to the occupations that could be most readily
applied to the conditions of prison manufactures and that promised
the greatest remuneration.17 This scarcity of work with the consequent economic loss and undesirable disciplinary conditions prompted
the adoption of various means of securing employment and led to
an active competition with free labor and citizen industry and thereby
called out severe opposition from mechanics and manufacturers.
(y). This burden of finding employment together with the ordinary penal affairs laid upon the office of the warden very difficult and
diversified tasks. The unprofitableness of the public-account system
which prevailed during the first quarter of the last century was
thought to be due to the fact that this system imposed more duties on
the warden than he was able to bear. 28. The specialization of industrial processes, both as a producer or manufacturer, and as a merchant
seeking a market, augmented the difficulty of managing prison industry, especially in the large institutions, and was a large factor in
leading to the adoption of the contract and lease systems whereby
the entrepreneur functions were turned over to contractors versed in
the various processes.29 .
'The scattering of industries was condemned by the Boston Prison Discipline Society in its first annual report (1826), because "where there is great
variety of employment the expense to the state is much greater than where
there is some one simple and useful trade which occupies the time of a majority
of the men." Unity of employment was recommended, because greater economy
could thereby be effected. But this criticism did not take into account the condition of the market which had prompted such scattering of industries. The
trades of coopering, weaving, shoe-making, tailoring, hat-making, and stonecutting were recommended, because the implements demanded are few and simple, the arts are easily learned, and the skill is in great demand after the prisoners are dismissed. The occupation most to be preferred, "where the material
is easily obtained and the market is good, is stone-cutting." The material is
cheap and not easily injured, the art is soon learned, is laborious and healthful,
requires little superintendence, the tools are few and simple, demand for work
is great, and "the business, on the whole, more profitable to the institution and
the knowledge of the art very useful to the convict after leaving prison." Likewise, there are but few objections to weaving. "The article is such as cannot
be manufactured in the steam loom or by water power, and it therefore pays
well for manual labor. * * * The business of shoemakers, hatters, tailors,
coopers, etc., though they are not particularly objectionable, have not been found
very profitable." (Boston Pris. Disc. Soc. Rept. 1826, p. 15.)
"Boston Pris. Disc. Soc. 1833, p. 76; N. Y. Bu. of Lab. Stat., Part I, 1911,
p. 180.
'Haynes' Hist. of Mass. State Prison, p. 242; N. P. A. 1886, p. 222. The
financial prosperity and the morals of the prispn fluctuated with the ability of
the keeper ("Inside Out," p. 22).

LABOR UNIONISM AND CONVICT LABOR
(z). The early state-account system was opposed because the
unemployment which was ascribed to it not only involved the prisons
in annual deficits, but also entailed undesirable penal conditions. The
best reformative results were held to go hand in hand with the
strictest enforcement of discipline under steady and vocationally useful employment; and the method of supervision and control was not
held to be of much significance so long as constant labor with its
salutary influence was obtainable.3 0 Hence to escape the penal and
economic evils of unemployment the private methods of control were
gradually introduced during and following the third decade of the
century.

(c). These private methods of control remained the principal
means of directing the labor of convicts almost to the present time.
It is only within the last few decades that the public has again assumed the more prominent role in the control of prison labor under
the state- or public-use system. Under the systems of private control
the extent of the supervision by the contractor over the convicts
varied from more or less minute restraint and direction in performing the task in the workshop to complete power over the care, housing, discipline and employment of the prisoners. In the contract
system the care and discipline of tha prisoners are reserved to the
warden as his special duty; while in the lease system all these functions are delegated to the lessee. In the piece-price system the power
of the contractor extends only to the purchase of the raw material
and to selling the finished goods, while the discipline of the prisoners
and the supervision of their labor is in the hands of responsible officers and foremen. During the period prior to the Civil War, the
contract system predominated, though the lease system was also used
somewhat in the Northern states. Following the Civil War the lease
system became the most general means of employment in the reconstructed states; but since the decade of the eighties the state-account
system has been reintroduced here and there, and the piece-price system has been adopted as a means of reconciling the demands of labor
unions and penologists. But the adoption of the state-account and
piece-price systems, it was discovered, did not remove the menace of
competition nor afford the corrective effects desired. Hence the recent
method of state-control and state-use was developed under which the
state and its political divisions use the convict labor in construction
"Boston Prison Discipline Society Report 1827, p. 73.
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and other public works and apply the products of prison industry to
the maintenance of its own institutions without entering the goods
upon the price market.
The adoption of the contract and lease systems was prompted by
a desire to secure regular and wholesome employment for penological
reasons and for greater financial returns. But the separation of the
entrepreneur function of the warden from his disciplinary duties was
due to industrial, rather than to penological developments. In free industry the factory supplanted the home-shop as the typical unit of
employment. "Instead of working by themselves or with a few assistants, men now . . .submit to a new discipline in large groups organ-

ized for purposes of production. Along with the new method of production there has been a change from restricted local markets to national, and even world markets.'"1 During the first half of the century the functions of manufacturer and merchant became highly complicated and required a high degree of specialization. The manufacturer must command large capital, and supervise intricate processes
of labor performed by the team work of a mass of workers. The merchant "reaches out for wholesale orders. He adds heavy expenses for
solicitation and transportation. He adds a storeroom and a larger
stock of goods. He holds the stock a longer time, and he gives long
and perilous credits at the same time. He meets competitiors from
other centers of manufacture, and cannot pass along his increased
expenses. Consequently the wage-bargain assumes importance, and
the employer, function comes into the front. Wages are reduced by
the merchant as employer on "workdestined for the wholesale market.
2
Following the middle of
The conflict of capital and labor begins."
the century our industrial processes receive a new impetus; machine
processes are made more extensive and more intricate, the market
expands still further and a keener competition arises. "The merchant-capitalist intensifies and even creates the antagonism of 'capital and labor.' He does this by forcing the separation of functions and
classes a step further than it had been forced in the wholesale-order
stage. First he takes away from the retail merchant his wholesaleorder business. He buys and sells large quantities; he assembles the
cheap products of prison labor, distant localities and sweatshops; he
informs himself of markets and beats down the charges for transportation-thus he takes to himself the wholesale business and leaves to
the merchant the retail trade. Second, he drives off the employer
'R. T. Ely: Outlines of Economics (1912), pp. 47-48.
"Hist. of Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 3, p. 39.

LABOR

UNIONISM

AND CONVICT

LABOR

function from the retail merchant. The journeyman he hands over to
specialists in wage-bargaining. ,33 In this growing factory system with
its consequent specialization and competition the wardens were unable
to hold their own in directing the prison industry, and therefore the
states turned over to private manufacturers the labor of the prisoners
in lieu of a specified daily or annual fee. This method of controlling
the labor of convicts continued in conformity to the industrial exigency until the demands of organized labor and penologists in recent
years forced the adoption by state legislatures of a system of applying
this labor which removes it from competition with free industry and
makes the reformation of the criminal and freedom from menacing
competition rather than pecuniary returns, the criterion of the success of the system of employment. Thus, until conscious and purposed control assumed the leading role in dictating policies, the manner
of imposing and supervising compulsory penal labor conforms to
the manner in which free industry is carried on in the given stage
of the industrial development. In the eighteenth century prison
labor resembles the handicraft stage of production. The first quarter of the nineteenth century shows the beginnings of the factory
method, and of competition between prison and free labor. The last
three-quarters of a century shows the relentless drive and specialization of the factory system in the exploitation of convicts under the
contract and lease systems in the hands of irresponsible entrepreneurs. These different methods of controlling convict labor fall into
the given order of sequence because of the peculiar industrial development of the respective periods.
(2). But the status of the industrial development is significant in
determining not only the form of imposing penal labor, but also
the nature and the extent of the competition between free citizen
labor and convict labor. Prior to the nineteenth century the handicraft and domestic system of production prevailed, and the journeymen and merchant-masters were able to secure a fair return from
their labor by setting the price of their wares according to the quality of the material and workmanship, and holding out for this price;
that is, by shifting the cost of material and labor to the customer.
Profit was not dependent on reducing wages as much as on increasing
prices. 34 But the nature of competition changed with the introduction of the factory system. The burden of competition shifted from
'Ibid., pp. 42-44.

'Ibid.,

p. 39.
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the quality of goods to their prices, and the burden of the competition was forced back on the laborer. The merchant-employer seeks
the distant market and as he cannot pass on to the consumers the
additional cost of reaching this distant market he must reduce
wages to keep down the cost. Next the merchant-capitalist intensifies this antagonism by forcing the separation of functions and
classes a step further. "He strips the former merchant-master both of
his market and his journeymen. The wholesale market he takes to
himself; the journeymen he hands over to a specialist in wage-bargaining. This. specialist is no longer known as 'master'--he takes
the name of 'boss' or employer. His profits are not those of the
capitalist, neither do they proceed from his ability as a merchant,
since the contract prices he gets are dictated by the merchantcapitalist. His profits come solely out of wages and work. He
organizes his workmen in teams with the work subdivided in order
to lessen the dependence on skill and increase speed of output. He
plays the less skilled against the anore skilled, the speedy against the
slow, and reduces wages while enhancing exertion. His profits are
'sweated' out of labor, his shop is the 'sweatshop,' he the
'sweater.'
The journeyman function is now segregated on two
levels of competition, the higher level of custom work and the lower
level menaced by prison and sweatshop work. The employer-function, the last to split off, makes its first appearance as a separate
factor on the lowest level of market competition. Evidently the wide
extension of the market in the hands of the merchant-capitalist is
a cataclysm in the position of the journeyman. By desperate effort
of organization he struggles to raise himself back to his original
level. His merchant-employers sympathize with him and endeavor to
pass over to their customers his just demand for a higher wage. But
they soon are crushed between the level of prices and level of wages.
From the position of a inerchants' association striving to hold up
prices they shift to that of an employers' association endeavoring
to keep down wages. ""
By this expansion of the market, division of functions, and development of team work and machine processes a separation of classes
and of interest arises. Competition occurs between mechanics or between laborers of the same class. But especially is the low-level competition a menace to higher-level workmen as a possible and real source
'Ibid., p. 42 ff.
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of under-bidding wages and prices. This fact is described by
Professor Commons in the following manner:
"Defining the 'marginal producer' as the one with the lowest
standard of living and prices and quality of work, he is the producer
whose competition tends to drag down the level of others toward his
own. It is not necessary that he be able actually to supply the whole
market or even the greater part of it. His effect on others depends
on the extent to which he can be used as a club to intimidate others
against standing out for their side of the bargain. He is a menace
rather than an actual competitor. Now, +he extension of the market
for the sale of goods is accompanied by an extension of the field for
the production of goods. This extension brings into the competitive
area new competitors who are essentially a series of low marginal
producers. The capitalist who can reach out for these low-level producers can use them at will to break down the spirit of resistance of
high-level producers. In the custom order stage there was but one
competitive menace, the shoemaker who made 'bad wares.' 6 In the
retail shop stage there is added the 'advertiser,' the 'public market'
and the auction system. In the wholesale-order stage there is added
the foreign producer, and in the wholesale-speculative stage the labor
of convicts and sweatshops. Thus the extension of the field of production increases the variety and discovers lower levels of marginal
producers, and the merchant-capitalist emerges as the generalissimo
menacing in turn every part of the field from his strategic center." 3 7
The role of convict labor as one of the sources of low-plane competition is to afford a menace to the higher-level citizen laborer. During the colonial period there is no evidence of this detrimental competition, but in the early part of the nineteenth century such a menace
shows itself in the endeavor of the wardens to find employment for the
inmates of the state prisons. Both the industrial factors creating
competition as described in the foregoing paragraphs and the abnormally large force of convict labor concentrated in the penitentiaries
contributed to this competition. As early as 1806 the scarcity of work
among the prisoners led the overseers of the Massachusetts State
prison to offer the labor of the convicts at greatly reduced wages because the cost 'of maintenance was very low. This fact of the low cost
of subsistence of convicts under any system of employment together
'Dr. Commons, in describing the history of the journeymen cordWainers,
but he says that this development epitomizes the development in the entire industrial revolution.
'Ibid., p. 48.
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with the fact that this labor is subsidized and may hence be let out for
more or less than the cost of such subsistence is the course of the evil
arising from the entrance of convict labor on the competitive market.
"In dull times the prison produces as before; its goods accumulate
and must be gotten rid of. In good times when labor is scarce and
the demand for goods is brisk, the independent manufacturer must
pay high wages and cannot afford to compete with the prison industry which pays no wages, tax or rent. Though the amount of prisonmade goods is relatively small, it affects the price of other goods
regardless of the quantity. One thousand pairs of shoes offered in
the market will affect the price of one million pairs of other shoes for
a year or more. If the amount of prison-made goods were not limited
and could be produced in any desired quantity, they would monopo38
The
lize the output and destroy the business of all competitors."
our
of
beginning
the
underbidding of the market was resorted to in
all
under
penitentiary system and has continued to the present time
system.
systems of employment excepting the recent public-use
The evils of competition have been usually ascribed by citizen
mechanics to the system in use at any given time and place. Under
the early state account system it was thought the underbidding of
the market was due to the fact that the state could lead the market,
and it was supposed that free competition in bidding for the labor of
convicts would remove the menace. When the contract and lease systems were introduced the underbidding continued. The menace was
then ascribed to the greed of the contractor who by reason of the low
rates paid for prison labor and the exploitation of the convicts was
89
But the competitive menace
enabled to undersell the general market.
continued under the state-account and piece-price systems which were
reintroduced in the latter part of the last century. 'When in the decades of the seventies and eighties the pressure by labor organizations
against the then existing contract system was most severe, prison
officials declared that convict labor, because of its relatively small
amount, produced no appreciable affect on free labor. The public
officials were of the opinion that the care with which contracts are
made and production and selling supervised is of more importance in
40
Both labor leaders and pubcompetition than the system employed.

"N. P. A., 1707, p. 135.

'Hist. Eastern Penit. Pa., p. 53; Ann. Rept. Boston Pris. Disc. Soc. 1833,
p. 75; Hist. Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, p. 53, ff.

'N. P. A. Rept. 1887, p. 320; Rept. Comm. of Lab. 1886 (the entire report
is devoted to convict labor).
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lie officials failed to see the real cause of the evil arising from the sale
of low-cost prison-made wares on the competitive market-the menace
of low-plane labor under the factory system of divided functions and,
interests. The iay of escape from this menacing competition was
finally sought in the adoption of the public-use system. This system
is now being extensively adopted as the outcome of a century of
incessant experimenting and legislation.
III. The program of organized effort for the control of convict
labor and the abolition of the unfair competition was prompted by
two motives-one ethical and the other economic. In a general way,
of course, the entire question of competition and the whole range of
economic relationship is an ethical problem. But in a more specific
way, certain moral abuses arising from the employment of convicts
have been protested against by citizen craftsmen and laborers. These
moral and economic motives and interest have given direction to the
demands and policies for the restriction of the employment of prison
labor and have supplied the incentive for a century of continual
agitation. The political activities of labor unionism can then be best
observed by an analysis of (1) these motives of action, (2) the demands of citizen mechanics in their endeavor to set bounds to the
nature and extent of the menace and displacement arising from the
employment of convict labor on marketable wares, and (3) the
attainment by legislation in this endeavor to secure freedom from this
competition.
(1). The motives of opposition against convict labor have arisen
from two sources; namely (a) the moral abuses, and (b) the economic
loss incurred by this menacing competition and by the displacement
of free labor by prison labor.
(a). The matter of unequal competition has always been looked
upon by citizen mechanics as unfair and hence as morally wrong.
But other more specific moral abuses were most emphatically condemned. Thus, for example, it was protested that "the government
grossly abuses its trust and inflicts incalculable injury on society
when it permits prison labor to control the results of regular and honest
competition and compels the citizen who has always kept his fealty to
41
the state to put his industry below the ordinary standard of reward.
In addition to this injury to the means of livelihood a second injustice
and moral wrong was early complained of. The permission granted
prison-taught and trained mechanics of coming into the ranks of free
"Doc. Hist. Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 6, p. 51.
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journeymen was declared to be even more nefarious than the economic
evils entailed upon the mechanics by the unfair competition. "The
,education of felons in the State Prisons in the mechanical arts results
in scattering abroad among honest mechanics and mechanics' families
and apprentices, a class of degraded men as their associates-thereby
poisoning the atmosphere of their workshop, converting them into
schools of vice and crime under the tuition of graduates from the
State Prison, and bringing disgrace on an honorable class of citizens. "42 It was also thought that the occupations of mechanics were
43
degraded in public estimation by the use of their trades in prisons.
During the entire period of our penitentiary system it has been held
by many citizens that the "hard-working and honest mechanic is
insulted by having felons put on an equal footing with him. The
rank of his trade are not filled with reputable and worthy men like
himself, but with the outpourings of the penitentiaries. '"4
Although these moral objections are still raised against these
abuses in the employment of convicts, there is more willingness on
the part of the laborers to give the ex-conviet a chance to make good
in his vocation, and more concrete content'has been embodied in the
ethical agitation. Thus in -thereport of the proceedings of the American Federation of Labor for 1901, it is declared that "The present
.
is a wrong to the -convicts
system of employing convicts .
themselves, making the name of the reform schools and penal institutions a misnomer, inasmuch as the inmates of such institutions,
instead of being taught some trade are under the present contract
system of employment further debased." 45 While citizen mechanics
today still resent working with an ex-convict, officially and, no doubt,
among increasing numbers of individuals, the right to an occupation
is granted the former offender against society, and protection is
afforded him against the cupidity of contractors of prison labor. The
solidarity of labor is acknowledged in opposition to the interests of the
capitalist and employer.
(b). In addition to these moral objections the economic evils of
competition prompted the opposition of labor unions against specific
conditions of the employment of convicts. "This competition showed
itself as a drag when the movement for higher wages began," and
'Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 322.

"Bu. of N. Y. Lab. Stat., Part 1, 1911, p. 177, ff.
"N. P. A. Rept. 1886, p. 248.
4
" Rept. Proceedings A. F. D. 1901, p. 194.
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organized labor at once formulated the issue which it has insistently
pressed for three-quarters of a century.'"'4 Even as early as the
second decade of the last century the economic loss to free mechanics
called out public disfavor against the employment of convicts on
mechanical arts. In 1816 public prejudice deterred citizens from
entering into contract for prison labor. 47 In 1823 the mechanics protested in the columns of the New York Mechanics' Gazette, against
the employment of convicts in the mechanical occupations and voiced
their apprehension that free laborers in the threatened trades would
be displaced by the convict labor. The employment of convicts, it
was stated, "created dissatisfaction in the minds of all whose business
happened to be introduced into the prisons.'"'s In 1825 the New York
State Prison, then located in New York City, was removed to "Mount
Pleasant" (now Sing Sing), by an act of the legislature, mainly because of the "demand of mechanics that convicts should not be employed upon the manufacture of goods that come in competition" with
citizen industry. At the new location of the prison the convicts were
employed in an extensive rock quarry. 49 In 1830 the abuses of displacement of citizen labor and the menace of underbidding the market
prices were very emphatically denounced in a journal championing
the cause of labor.50 In 1834 the New York mechanics condemned
officially the "prison monopoly" and petitioned congress to abolish the
contract system." Both in New York and Pennsylvania "the excitement on this subject had reached a dangerous height" among the
mechanics, but the report of committees appointed to investigate the
effect of prison labor upon citizen industry declares that prison-made
goods were not sold for less than market prices, that the relative
amount of prison labor was insignificant, that no detrimental competition was created, and that no occasion for such unrest existed.52
'Doc. Hist. Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, p. 35.
'G. Powers: A Brief Hist. of N. Y. State Prison, p. 25.
'Doc. Hist. Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, p. 51.
"Inspectors of N. Y. Pris. Rept. 1868, p. 25.
'Doc. Hist. Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, p. 52.
"N. Y. Bu. of Lab. Stat., Part I, 1911, p. 177, ff.
"Hist. Eastern Penit. Pa., p. 53, ff. The New York Committee reported
to the legislature (Bu. of Lab. Stat., Part I, 1911, p. 177, ff.) that the dissatisfaction was due to the contract system and that all occasion for opposition
would be removed if the length- of the contracts were limited, bidding for prison
labor made public and open, and employment applied to articles that are mostly
imported. In 1833 a committee reported, condemning not the contract, but the
unprofitableness and inhumaneness of the public account system (Boston .Pris.
Disc. Soc. Rept. 1833, p. 75).
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But the report of the journeymen cordwainers represents that the
prison-made goods were being sold thirty per cent below the established prices. At that reduced rate it was declared, "no regular
manufacturer could pretend to sustain himself and pay half wages
to his journeymen." Another source of severe resentment was the
fact that goods were made in prison forty per cent "below the most
reduced journeyman's wages." 5
The dread and dislike with which
free.mechanics and manufacturers regarded the low-plane competition is further shown by a "memorial" to congress by the master and
journeymen cordwainers of the District of Columbia in 1839. This
petition to congress represents that the labor of the convicts was let
out to a-contractor who represented himself to be a manufacturer
with establishments in Philadelphia and New York. By the cheapness
of this labor he was able to underbid free labor and thereby to "insure
to his establishment a great and increasing custom," which threatened
to throw the citizen mechanics out of employment, depriving them ol'
their only means of livelihood. 4
During the time of the rapid growth of the factory system following the Civil War, trades unions came together to consider means
of protection "against further encroachment of their means of living
by the legislatures and prison authorities of the various states."5 5
The public protests against the moral and economic wrongs became
more numerous as the decades went by; and since the federation of
labor unions in 1886 not a convention is held during which it is not
declared that this competition "is unfair and unjust inasmuch as
the product of convict contract labor is sold below the regular market price of the product of free labor, '"56 and that the policy of conducting prison labor for the profit of contractors or of the state is
unjust to the convict and the honest citizen.5 7 The motives of opposi'Hist. Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, p. 51, if.
Doc. No. 174, 25th Cong., 3d Sess., Vol. 111.

There was sufficient
reason for alarm, for 55 of the 74 male convicts of the penitentiary were em"Sen.

ployed at making shoes, as is shown by the warden's report of 1839. He also
states that the boot and shoe department "will not-suffer by comparison with
the best shops in the country." Other departments were less successful because
of the "difficulty of disposing of the articles manufactured."
"Proceedings of Convention of Workingmen, 1879-1881.
'A. F. of L. Report 1910, p. 230.
YIbid., 1906, p. 25; 1910, Pres. Rept. The attitude of the A. F. of L. can be
readily traced in the Reports of Proceedings since 1886. The volumes are_ well
indexed and the discussions and resolutions are easily located.
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tion against the uncontrolled competition of prison labor have,
throughout the history of the penitentiary system, been both moral
and economic and have grown in intensity as the industrial revolution progressed.
(2). The motives which prompted the program of agitation and
opposition against convict labor also determined the nature of the
demands proposed in this legislative program. Various restrictions
and means of control were early suggested, but they lacked concreteness and effectiveness in attaining the desired end. But as the struggle continued the issue was defined with increasing clearness, and
today embodies extensive statutes for setting limits to competition
from prison labor. Throughout the entire period the contest centered mainly about the employment of prisoners in mechanical arts
and the disposition of the wares, of these arts on the competitive
market, with the consequent menace to prices and wages in free
industry. Several suggestions in the third and fourth decades had
considerable merit as means of limiting the severity of competition
but they were far in advance of public opinion and were not put into
effect for many years; while other proposed devices affected only the
apparent cause of competition and did not reach the real source of
the evil. For example it was thought that the menace was due to
the fact that the state led the market prices, or that the reason for
the contractor's underselling the market was due to the absence of free
and open competition in bidding for the labor of convicts, or that the
evil of the mechanical employment of convict labor lay in the fact
of long terms of contract whereby the employer was enabled to make
the prison laborers efficient, and that the evil would be removed by
limiting the term of contract. To be sure such misapprehensions have
been quite prevalent among both mechanics and prison officers till
recent years, but the trial of all the systems of employment under
private or public control save the state-use system finally demonstrated
that the menace in competition was due to the selling on the open market of subsidized and low-plane prison labor.
Other proposals in the first half of the entury for the limitation of
competition provided that convicts be employed only on occupations
not practiced among citizen mechanics or in the manufacture of
articles supplied by importation. It was further suggested that
prisoners be employed on mechanical arts for government use only,
and in construction work on buildings, roads and canals. But all
these, it was protested by public officials, would not remedy the cause
of competition, and would merely displace other citizen mechanics in
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work that belonged to them by the right of citizenship; and it was
further objected that the government had neither the organization nor
8
the capital to enter on such projects of public improvement
Unskilled workmen also objected against being robbed of their work
by convict labor. They contended that it was unjust to withhold
the mechanical trades from the prisoners and employ them
The same contentions
in the non-mechanical occupations. 9
are made even today, but the most satisfactory adjustment
so far found, labor unions say, is in the practice followed
in the state-use system, which is the best solution outside of the
employment of prisoners on public farms and at reclamation work."
There has been a constant effort to restrict the labor of convicts to
the less crowded occupations, and it is safe to assume that no adjustment will be reached that meets with complete satisfaction of all
citizen mechanics and laborers because locally any employment will
displace free labor to a greater or less extent. But the official policy
of federated labor concerning the control of convict labor is safe and
sane, and will never be likely to urge such restrictions in its imposition as to detract from the use of such labor for the best social ends.
As competition became more severe along with the industrial revolution and as the social consciousness expanded, more concrete measures were suggested and more emphatic demands made for the restriction of the menace of convict labor. These demands related both to
the economic and moral evils. The economic demands included such
measures as the restriction of the occupations open to convict labor,
limiting the hours of emlloyment of prisoners whether employed by
the state or by contractors, preventing interstate shipment of prisonmade goods, branding all such goods, employing prisoners in the
manufacture of wares supplied by importation, forbidding the importation of raw or finished goods upon which convict labor has been
bestowed, restricting the use of powerful machinery in prison industry,
demanding the use of hand processes so far as possible, limiting
the number of prisoners employed in the production of marketable
wares, abolishing the contract, lease, piece-price and state-account
systems and demanding the adoption of public control and public
-Sen. Doc. No. 174, 25th Cong., 3d Sess., Vol. III; Bu. of N. Y. Lab. Stat.,
Part I, 1911, pp. 177-84.

"Hist. of Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 8, pp. 223-225.
c°A. F. of L. 1897, pp. 22, 76.
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use of convict labor, 1 The moral and humanitarian measures were
partly linked with the foregoing proposals, and included the extending of protection to the prisoner against exploitation by contractors,
i. e., abolishing private control and substituting public control, granting the convict wholesome and instructive employment, granting him
or his dependent family a share in the fruit of his labor, limiting the
hours of his day's work, making the object of his work reformatory
in elementary educarather than profitable, aid granting instruction
62
tion to the corrigible and young offenders.
In comparing the later moral and aconomic demands with the
earlier ones a decided growth and improvement is seen. New means are
sought for the restriction of competition and a new force-the federation of labor-is created to attain the demands. The moral attitude
has changed. The resentment against teaching convicts a trade and
scattering them among "honest mechanics" has given way to a condemnation of the Penal system that fails to reform and to give needed
training and instruction in useful trades and elementary education
to the corrigible prisoner. The hatred of the criminal has been tempered somewhat with pity for the offender and with a desire to protect
him against an avaricious or thoughtless contractor or lessee; reformation and not profit is demanded of the penal institutions. This development of the economic and moral demands of mechanics has been
influenced not only by the growing solidarity of interests of the
laborers resulting from the industrial expansion, but also by the
enlarged social consciousness and socialized philosophy. The moral
and political demands of the earlier stage of the development of
competition arising from the employment of convict labor were influenced by the transeedental philosophy and idealistic attitude pervading our political and. social life at that time. But this higher idealism
has given way to a lower idealism for the amelioration and improvement of social conditions by concrete and, perhaps, commonplace
remedies by legislation and social control. This new political philoso-

'A. F. of L. 1890, p. 36; 1897, pp. 22-76; 1898, p. 64; 1909, p. 222; 1899,
(Orange, N. Y.),

p.148; 1901, p. 124; Proceeding of Convention of Workingmen

1879: Eaves: Cal. Lab. Leg., p. 30, ff.; Rept. Comm. of Lab. 1886, pp. 572, 586.
'The editor of the International Moulders' Journal thus summarizes the attitude of labor unions: "Briefly reviewed, the trade-union attitude toward prison
no
labor is that its first object should be the prisoner's reformation; that underthat
circumstances should any element of private profit enter into consideration;
for
the labor performed by the prisoners should be of a useful nature and thatupon
his labor the convict should be paid, for the benefit of those dependent the
him and for his own assistance upon regaining freedom; and, finally, that
principal object of the state should be to protect itself from the vicious and
unfortunate, to give them an adequate opportunity for reformation, but not to
derive profit from their labor" (Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. dnd Soc. Sci. March,
1913, p. 137.
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phy is seen in all phases of our social life, and in the control of prison
labor, has resulted in the last twenty-five years in extensive legislation
for the protection of convicts against the cupidity of contractors and
of citizen mechanics against the menace of .a low-plane competition."
(3). These achievements can be traced step by step throughout the
history of our factory system. As early as 1823 mechanics of New York
declared that they would lend their "suffrage to such only as would
pledge themselves to use their best effort to stop" 6 4 the evil of displacing free mechanics by convict labor. In 1835 these mechanics
urged that prisoners be restricted to their own trade if they have
any when they are imprisoned. 63 Such a law was enacted in 1844,
but afforded little or no relief, partly because it was not enforced, and
partly because, even when enforced, the menace continued.6 6 The
mechanics "resolved" concerning the moral disgrace and economic
injury that they would never cease their "exertion against this prime
evil till the last vestiges of the statutes which uphold it are totally
eradicated from the records of the state. "67 In 1847 the term of the
contract was limited to five years, a consideration that had been urged
in 1835.68 In Connecticut it was the policy in the forties to manu-

'Following the Civil War, when the menace of low competition was most
severe and opposition against contract prison labor was at its height, demands
of labor unions were opposed as having little merit and being ungrounded in
fact. The statistics gathered by the U. S. Commissioner of Labor in 1886 concerning convict labor had the effect, contrary to justice, of discrediting the arguments advanced by labor organizations. For it was found that the Droduct of
prison labor was only .054 of one per cent of the total mechanical product of
the country. The total prison population of those institutions in which productive labor was carried on was but one in a thousand of the population of
the country, and those engaged in convict labor only one in three hundred of
those engaged in free mechanical labor. Prominent prison officials and penologists, who had formerly sided with citizen laborers, now emphatically declared
that labor unions were prompted by greed and prejudice. The general opinion
expressed in the meetings of the National Prison Congress in 1887 was that no
aporeciable effect was produced by convict labor upon citizen labor (N. P. A.
1887; 1885. p. 205; 1899, p. 216, ff.; Comm. of Lab. 1886, p. 137, ff.; 5th Ann.
Conf. of Charities, p. 166). But "union men, being for years brought constantly
and intimately in contact with the economic and social consequences of contract
prison labor," persevered in the struggle and won their demands (Annals Amer.
Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci., March, 1913, p. 10). For a statement of the influence of labor unions on the political parties and their platforms, see Ibid. and
"Text Book of Labor's Political Demands" (1906).
"Doc. Hist. of Amer. Ind. Soc., Vol. 5, p. 51.
'N. Y. Bu. of Lab. Stat., Part I, 1911, pp. 180-181.
'Doc. Hist., Vol. 8, p. 322.
6Ibid.
"Rept. Comm. of Lab. 1886, p. 576; Bu. of Lab. Stat. of N. Y. Rept. 1911,
Part I, p. 180.
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facture only those articles "commonly imported into the United States
and which would not come into direct competition with the industries
of the state.'"19 The effort to restrict the trades that might be used
in prisons was early successful in various states. As craft organizations developed after the Civil War they opposed the use of their
trades in prison industry and organizations were effected to combat
the evil resulting from the extensive use of their trade in prison manufacture.70 In 1878 the hatters of New Jersey succeeded, after a protracted struggle, in getting a bill through the legislature prohibiting
the manufacture of hats in the Trenton Prison.7 1 In 1883 the New York
legislature prohibited the manufacture of fur or wool hats in any
72
prison of the state, either under the contract or state-account systems,
and in California the employment of convicts on marketable wares
was limited to the manufacture of jute sacks, which industry is not
carried on by free labor save among a few Chinamen. 73 Protection
against fraud and competition was sought by labeling prison-made
wares, and several states in 1883 enacted such laws for goods consigned for state, but not for interstate shipment.7 4 Higher contract
prices and an eight hour day7 5were advocated as a means of preventing
underbidding of the market.
The many minor demands looking toward restriction and control
of the competitive menace and the moral abuses affecting both the
convict and the citizen laborer were mostly summed up in the opposition against the private methods of control and in the demand for
the adoption of public control and use of prison labor. The private
method of control prevailed for the greater part of the last century
and were not restricted by legislation till the amalgamation and federation of trade unions were affected. The preamble of the Knights
of Labor "declared to the world" that one of its aims was "to prohibit
the hiriig out of convict labor.' '76 The American Federation of
Labor likewise opposed with all its energy and relentless hatred the
contract and lease systems and through its legislative committees
directed the state and national campaigns against these systems of
'Amer. Ec. Assn. Pub. Ser. 3, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 236.
10A. F. of L. Rept. 1889, p. 26; 1909, p 316.
"Proceedings of Convention of Workingmen, 1879-1881.
"Rept. Comm. of Lab, 1886, p. 578.
"Eaves: Cal. Lab. Leg., p. 262, ff.
7'A. F. of L., 1909, p. 222; Rept. Comm. of Lab. 1886, pp. 572, 586.
'A. F. of L., 1885, p. 17; 1897, p. 76
'R. T. Ely Labor Movement in America, p. 87.
877

E. T. HILLER

private control. Where competition with low-level workers was
keenest and where sympathy (and the labor vote) was strongest, the
restrictions were achieved earliest. In 1879 California forbade the
use of the contract system by constitutional .and statutory enactments.7 7 Pennsylvania forbade its use in 1883, New Jersey and New
York in 1884, Ohio, Illinois and Wyoming in 1886, Massachusetts and
the Federal Government in 1887. In 1867 the contract and lease
systems were the prevailing method of employment throughout the
country, the state-account system being in use in only three prisons
in the Union, but in 1899 the contract system was forbidden by
eighteen states and territories, 'including the District of Columbia.
In 1905 twenty-eight states restricted the use of the contract after
the expiration of the then existing agreements, and in 1911 the last
vestige of the employment of convicts under the contract system had
disappeared from twenty-six states, and was in partial use along
with systems of public control in sixteen states, but remained the
7
exclusive means of employmen-rin only three states. 1
Although the contract system was abolished and the state-account
and piece-price systems were employed, competition continued unchecked, and a movement began for the adoption of a method of
employing prisoners whereby the products of their labor should be
withheld from the competitive market and used by the state and its
political divisions on public works and in the manufacture of articles
for public institutions. This is known as the state- or public-use system. This manner of employment has been agitated ever since 1835,
and is within the last few years coming to be the most conspicuous
7
method of employing those sentenced to compulsory penal labor. 1
But even this method is not altogether satisfactory to citizen laborers
and mechanics "because it reserves for convicts much of the work of
the state and its political divisions that rightfully belongs to the free
laborer.80 But it is held by labor unionism to be the best method of
employment yet devised and is, in the main, meeting with satisfaction
because of its moral provisions and its relative freedom from a harmful
competitive menace. Citizen mechanics urge that convicts be engaged
on public land, in gardening and at other public outdoor work,81 and

Cal. Tabl. Leg., p. 362.
"'Jour. of Criminal Law and Criminology, July, 1914, pp. 255-260.

"Eaves:

"Ibid, p. 261, if., and N. Y. Bu. of Lab. Stat., Part I, 1911, p. 180.
'A. F. of L., 1897, p. 76, ff.
"Iabid.

LABOR UNIONISM AND CONVICT LABOR

such forms of 2labor are being generally employed by the various states
of the Union.
The adoption of these recent methods of employing convicts is
the outcome of a century of endeavor of citizen mechanics to secure
freedom from the menacing competition of prison labor. This competition was brought on (1) by the development of our penitentiary
system whereby compulsory labor was made a means of punishment
and reformation, thus creating a large potential supply of prison
labor and whereby convicts sentenced to such labor were concentrated
in relatively few occupations within narrow markets, and (2) by the
development of the factory method of production which resulted in the
division of classes and functions, shifted the burden of competition to
the laborer and made low-plane producers a menace to the standard
of living of the higher-plane workman. Convict labor is such a menace
in competition and is objectionable on moral and economic grounds.
To remedy these evils labor unions have striven for various restrictive
and regulative measures and have turned to political activities to obtain their demands. By this political program, legislation has been
effected abolishing the systems of private control and adopting public
control and, in an increasing measure, public use, of convict labor. By
this triumph of social control, the prisoner is protected against exploitation and the citizen mechanic against unequal and unfair competition.
"Jour. of Criminal Law and Criminology, July, 1914, p. 266.

